abstract Spinoza's account of acquiescentia has been obscured by inconsistent translations of acquiescentia, and forms of the verb acquiescere, in the standard English edition of the Ethics. For Spinoza, acquiescentia is an inherently cognitive affect, since it involves an idea of oneself (as the cause of one's joy). As such, the affect is closely correlated to the three kinds of cognition identified by Spinoza in Ethics II. Just as there are three kinds of cognition, so too are there three kinds of acquiescentia. Two qualities-stillness and obedience-provide the criteria for distinguishing between these. This illuminates Spinoza's positive account of acquiescentia, and also clarifies how it responds critically to the equivalent Cartesian passion, la satisfaction de soimême, which is translated as acquiescentia in se ipso in the relevant Latin edition of Les passions de l'âme.
s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a
place among-and contributes something distinctive to-the cluster of concepts that define beatitudo: intuitive knowledge, eternity, and the intellectual love of God.
Since the English 'acquiescence' captures the twofold sense of stillness or rest, and acceptance or obedience, 'acquiescence in oneself' may not be a bad translation of acquiescentia in se ipso. 7 However, this leaves out the joy that is integral to Spinoza's definition of acquiescentia in se ipso-whereas 'self-esteem' at least conveys the idea of positive feeling. Perhaps 'self-contentment' offers the best compromise between 'acquiescence in oneself' and 'self-esteem,' since contentment suggests a peaceful kind of joy. In her 1856 translation of the Ethics, George Eliot interprets acquiescentia in se ipso in this way: her Spinoza claims that "self-contentment is in truth the highest point we can hope to attain."
8 Eliot translates Part V's acquiescentia animi as "repose of mind" or "peace of mind," so that, like Curley, she obfuscates the continuity between the acquiescentia of Parts III and IV and that of Part V. Donald Rutherford may be right to suggest that "there is no fully satisfactory translation of the phrase [acquiescentia in se ipso] in English."
9
In this paper, then, acquiescentia will remain untranslated, in order to retain the rich and multiple resonance the term has for Spinoza.
The first section of this paper considers how Spinoza's concept of acquiescentia is formed by, and responsive to, Descartes's discussion of la satisfaction de soi-même. The second section elucidates Spinoza's account of acquiescentia according to his three kinds of cognition, showing that each kind of cognition has its corresponding affect of acquiescentia. The concluding section summarises this Spinozist theory of acquiescentia, indicates its place within his philosophical system, and briefly raises the question of how acquiescentia might be cultivated in practice.
. s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a i n s e i p s o a n d d e s c a r t e s ' s s a t i s f a c t i o n d e s o i -m ê m e
For Spinoza, acquiescentia was a new term, not known before its use in Descartes's Passions of the Soul. According to Christian Wolff, Descartes "introduced acquiescentia in se ipso into philosophy." 10 But of course Wolff was referring to the first Latin translation of Les passions de l'âme, completed by Henri Desmarets in 1650, just a year after the French original.
11 So Desmarets, rather than Descartes, should be credited with bringing acquiescentia into the philosophical vocabulary.
12 In the second part of Les passions de l'âme Descartes defines and discusses a series of particular passions, among them la satisfaction de soy-mesme, which he opposes to le Repentir. In translating article 63 of Les passions de l'âme, Part II, Desmarets chooses acquiescentia in se ipso for la Satisfaction de soy-mesme, and dat nobis acquiescentiam interiorem for nous donne une Satisfaction interior. Article 190, in Part III of Descartes's text, returns to la Satisfaction de soy-mesme, and this time Desmarets chooses, twice, Satisfactio sive Acquiescentia in se ipso.
13
Why does Desmarets coin the neologism acquiescentia to translate Descartes's la satisfaction, instead of using only the more obvious satisfactio? Acquiescentia conveys stillness or rest, and although this sense may be implicit in satisfactio, it is made much more explicit by acquiescentia. In article 190, Descartes emphasizes that this quality of stillness or rest belongs to la Satisfaction de soy mesme of the consistently virtuous person: la Satisfaction, qu'ont tous-jours ceux qui constamment la vertu, est une habitude en leur âme, qui se nomme tranquillité & repos de conscience.
14 Desmarets translates the latter part of this sentence as "Tranquillitas & Quies Conscientiae," and he amplifies it by identifying the passion of la satisfaction as acquiescentia as well as satisfactio. This decision is not unfaithful to the original text. But while Descartes explicates satisfaction in terms of tranquillité and repos, Desmarets makes quies integral to this passion, and thus inseparable from it.
Spinoza's incorporation of the term acquiescentia in se ipso into his own discussion of the affects in Ethics III and IV engages closely with Descartes's Passions of the Soul.
15
Spinoza is clearly indebted to the Cartesian account of la satisfaction de soi-même, and it is equally clear that he engages critically with it. This close critical engagement is partially obscured when Spinoza's acquiescentia in se ipso is translated into English as 'self-esteem,' while the corresponding Cartesian passion is translated as 'selfsatisfaction.'
16 (And confusion is further encouraged by the fact that Descartes's la satisfaction de soi-même is a distinct passion from l'estime, which is coupled with and opposed to le mépris in article 54.)
Six features of Descartes's discussion of 'self-satisfaction' are echoed in Spinoza's discussion of acquiescentia in se ipso:
(1) 'Self-satisfaction' is a joy relating to an action that a person has caused herself: "We may consider the cause of a good or evil, present as well as past. A good done by ourselves gives us an internal satisfaction."
17 This joy, Descartes
13
For a comparison of the French and Latin texts, see Totaro, "Acquiescentia dans la cinquième partie de l'Ethique de Spinoza," 68. 14 René Descartes, Oeuvres, 471. 15 See Totaro, "Acquiescentia dans la cinquième partie de l'Ethique de Spinoza"; and Voss, "How Spinoza enumerated the Affects." On the reception of Spinoza's account of the passions in relation to the Cartesian background, see Piet Steenbakkers, "Lodewijk Meyer's catalogue of the passions," 103-128. It should be noted, however, that Desmarets's interpretative decision regarding acquiescentia puts a small but significant distance between Spinoza and Descartes. It is unlikely that Descartes, who died in 1650, read and authorized Desmarets's Latin translation of his text (see Voss, "On the authority of the Passiones Animae"). And it is unlikely that Spinoza read the original French text of the Passions. In this case, Spinoza would not have known that acquiescentia translated la satisfaction, and indeed he might never have wondered about the French original. He may well have taken acquiescentia at face value, as carrying connotations of stillness and rest, acceptance and obedience. He certainly exploits these connotations in responding to what he could have reasonably taken to be the Cartesian account of acquiescentia in se ipso.
16
See Descartes, CSM 351-2, 396-7. 17 Descartes, CSM 351. s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a emphasizes, "depends completely on ourselves."
18 Similarly, Spinoza states that "I shall call Joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, Acquiescentia in se ipso," and that "Acquiescentia in se ipso is a Joy born of the fact that a man considers himself and his own power of acting."
19
(2) Self-satisfaction is coupled with, and opposed to, repentance (le repentir). Descartes defines repentance as "a kind of sadness" that "results from believing we have done an evil deed."
20 Similarly, in Ethics III, Spinoza identifies the sadness contrary to acquiescentia in se ipso as "repentance."
21 In his Definitions of the Affects, Spinoza qualifies this by distinguishing between two senses of acquiescentia in se ipso: one opposed to humility, and the other opposed to repentance. (We will return to this distinction in the second section of the paper.) (3) Descartes elevates self-satisfaction above the other passions, insofar as he describes it as "the sweetest of all the passions" (while repentance is "the most bitter . . . because its causes lie in ourselves alone").
22 As we have seen, Spinoza suggests that "Acquiescentia in se ipso is really the highest thing we can hope for." (4) Self-satisfaction can be either "a habit of the soul" or "a passion," depending on whether it accompanies the steadfast pursuit of virtue, or arises as a "fresh satisfaction" following the performance of "an action we think good."
23
Spinoza echoes this distinction in his account of acquiescentia. Like all the affects, acquiescentia can be predominantly passive, "a confused idea," and fleeting, contributing to "vacillations of mind."
24 In contrast with the "ignorant man," the "wise man" enjoys lasting acquiescentia, "always possesses true peace of mind [vera animi acquiescentia] ."
25
(5) Having distinguished between the "habit" and the "passion" of selfsatisfaction, Descartes suggests that the latter may be either genuine or "vain." When the cause of our self-satisfaction "is not just, i.e. when the actions from which we derive great satisfaction are not very important or are even vicious, [then our] satisfaction is absurd and serves only to produce a kind of vanity and impertinent arrogance." 26 In the Ethics, Spinoza identifies this deluded form of self-satisfaction as pride (Superbia), defined as "thinking more highly of oneself than is just, out of love for oneself."
27 Pride is a species of acquiescentia in se ipso: "it can also be defined as love of oneself, or acquiescentia in se ipso, insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks more highly of himself than is just."
28 More generally, though, Spinoza suggests that acquiescentia itself, not just its prideful form, can be "empty" (vana). 
29
(6) Descartes illustrates his description of vain self-satisfaction by the example of religious bigotry, hypocrisy and violence. Just over half of article 190 is devoted to this example, which is depicted in particularly vivid and forceful terms. The "vanity" and "impertinent arrogance" of deluded self-satisfaction, writes Descartes, is noticeable especially in those who believe themselves devout, but are merely bigoted and superstitious. These are people who-under the pretext of frequently going to church, reciting many prayers, wearing their hair short, fasting, and giving alms-think that they are absolutely perfect and imagine that they are such close friends of God that they could not do anything to displease him. They suppose that anything their passion dictates is a commendable zeal, even though it sometimes dictates the greatest crimes that men can commit, such as the betrayal of cities, the killing of sovereigns, and the extermination of whole peoples for the sole reason that they do not accept their opinions.
30
The specificity and detail of this passage suggests that Descartes's observations of errant religiosity provide not simply an example of vain self-satisfaction, but the motivation for his account of this passion. Perhaps these observations constitute the context for his discussion of the entire concept of self-satisfaction-both true and false, virtuous and vicious. The connections between Spinoza's account of acquiescentia and superstitious religion will be explicated in some detail in the following section of this paper. Spinoza's critique of superstition provides an important context for the Ethics, and in particular for his analysis of the affects and of "human bondage." Spinoza understands superstition in both cognitive and affective terms (indeed, these are not really separable for him): superstition is always based on inadequate cognition, and manifest in the passion of fear, and as such it is opposed to the freedom and blessedness arising from adequate understanding and manifest in the active affect of love.
31 This contrast between inadequate cognition and fear, on the one hand, and adequate knowledge and love on the other, shows up in Spinoza's distinction between two kinds of acquiescentia. He criticizes the "empty" acquiescentia in se ipso "that is encouraged only by the opinion of the multitude," not only because it is irrational, but because it makes people both fearful and violent: "he who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily. . . . [T] his gives rise to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way possible."
32 However, true acquiescentia in se ipso arises from reason: "the greatest acquiescentia in se ipso there can be arises from [man's] On the link between superstition and fear, see the Preface to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus: TTP 3-5/SO vol. 3, 5-6. See also Susan James, Philosophy, Religion and Politics in Spinoza, [15] [16] [17] 194; André Tosel, "Superstition and Reading"; Steven Nadler, Spinoza's Heresy, ; and Clare Carlisle, "Spinoza on Eternal Life." 32 E VP58S. Spinoza also emphasizes the practical aspect of acquiescentia in se ipso. In the scholium to E VP10, which focuses on the cultivation and disciplining of the mind by a practice, at once imaginative and rational, of frequently attending to "a correct principle of living, or sure maxim of life," he advises his reader to "keep in mind that the highest satisfaction of mind [summa acquiescentia animi] stems from the right principle of living." 33 E VIP52Dem. s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a own power of acting, accompanied by (indeed, inseparable from) the adequate idea of oneself as the cause of this joy.
There are, then, significant continuities between Descartes's satisfaction de soimême and Spinoza's acquiescentia in se ipso. However, Spinoza appropriates these six characteristics of la satisfaction de soi-même in a way that critiques and subverts the Cartesian passion. This appropriation targets a central tenet of Cartesian philosophy: the freedom of the human will. For Descartes, virtue consists in the rational exercise of free will-and this is particularly relevant to the twin passions of self-satisfaction and repentance, since we deserve to be praised or blamed only for using our freedom well or badly. These passions accompany deeds "done by ourselves," that is to say deeds caused by "ourselves alone," through our own volitions. Self-satisfaction is closely connected to générosité, which is, for Descartes, "the key to all the other virtues and a general remedy for every disorder of the passions."
34 Descartes explains that générosité involves both the affirmation of human freedom and the "constant resolution" to use this freedom well.
35 "There is only one thing in us which could give us good reason to esteem ourselves, namely, the exercise of our free will and the control we have over our volitions," writes Descartes.
36
We have seen that Descartes distinguishes between true and illusory, vain selfsatisfaction, identifying superstitious religion with the latter. For Spinoza, however, the whole Cartesian concept of self-satisfaction-along with its mirror image, repentance-belongs within the category of illusion. We only imagine that our wills are free, and imagination (the "first kind of cognition") is inadequate.
37 A "decision of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguished from the imagination itself," writes Spinoza, concluding that those who "believe that they do anything from a free decision of the mind, dream with open eyes."
38 He argues that the idea of free decision is a "fiction."
39 Throughout the Ethics, Spinoza asserts that belief in free will is a symptom of ignorance: "men think themselves free, because they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think . . . of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of those causes."
40 In fact, Spinoza states plainly, "the will cannot be a free cause, but only a necessary one"-and this applies to both God and human beings.
41
When Spinoza defines acquiescentia in se ipso together with repentance in his Definitions of the Affects, he links both affects to the erroneous belief in free will. He distinguishes this inadequate form of acquiescentia in se ipso from a more neutral form-that opposed to humility-which does not involve the idea of free will:
Acquiescentia in se ipso is opposed to Humility, insofar as we understand by it a Joy born of the fact that we consider our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it a Joy, accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decision of the Mind, it is opposed to Repentance, which we define as follows.
43
Repentance is a Sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed we believe ourselves to have done from a free decision of the Mind.
44
In his Explanation of the latter definition, Spinoza refers the reader back to Part II: "On the free decision of the Mind, see IIP35s." The reference is damning. The scholium to E IIP35 elucidates the proposition that "[f]alsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve" using the example of belief in free will: "men are deceived in thinking themselves free . . . they say that human actions depend on the will, but these are only words for which they have no idea. For all are ignorant of what the will is."
45 Thus, Spinoza presents the Cartesian affects of acquiescentia in se ipso and repentance as intrinsically inadequate. Indeed, these affects are irredeemably bound up with a proliferation of negative connotations: falsity, privation of knowledge, mutilated and confused ideas, self-deception, ignorance.
In distinguishing between true and vain self-satisfaction, Descartes suggests that the latter can lead to violence and persecution: "it sometimes dictate the greatest crimes that men can commit, such as . . . the extermination of whole peoples." But for Spinoza, it is the misguided commitment to free will which produces, or at least stimulates, the kind of violence Descartes describes. At E IIIP49, Spinoza argues that the fiction of free will exacerbates the affects of both love and hatred: "because men consider themselves to be free, they have a greater love or hate toward one another than toward other things."
46 Spinoza returns to this point at E VP5, this time emphasizing the link between belief in free will and ignorance: "imagining a thing as free can be nothing but simply imagining it while we are ignorant of the causes by which it has been determined to act."
47 In describing the affective consequences of the idea of free will, he refers specifically to acquiescentia in se ipso and repentance. Having repeated his definition of these affects as joy or sadness "accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause," he adds that " [b] ecause men believe themselves to be free, these affects are very violent (see P49 
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See Christoph Wittich, Anti-Spinoza, 228; and Cooper, Secular Powers, 94. s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a of humility (in contrast to the more Cartesian definition of acquiescentia in se ipso, coupled with repentance, that involves belief in free will). These neutral definitions characterize both affects in terms of sheer quantity of power: "Acquiescentia in se ipso is a Joy born of the fact that a man considers himself and his own power of acting. . . . Humility is a Sadness born of the fact that a man considers his own lack of power, or weakness." 50 In the Explanation to his definition of repentance, Spinoza reflects on the moral force of this affect, and of its corresponding acquiescentia. He attributes this to education and custom, which condition people to have certain emotional responses to their own actions:
it is no wonder Sadness follows absolutely from all those acts which from custom are called wrong, and Joy, those which are called right. For from what has been said above we easily understand that this depends chiefly on education. Parents-by blaming the former acts, and often scolding their children on account of them, and on the other hand, by recommending and praising the latter acts-have brought it about that the emotions of Sadness were joined to the one kind of act, and those of Joy to the other.
Experience itself also confirms this. For not everyone has the same custom and Religion . . . according as each one has been educated, so he either repents of a deed or exults at being esteemed for it.
51
Spinoza seems to present this simply as a fact of experience: he does not explicitly criticize the effects of moral education in shaping affective habits. In broader context, though, we have seen that he associates both moralism and immoralityespecially the kind that accompanies superstitious religion-with the mistaken belief in free will. This is not merely a critique of Descartes, who on Spinoza's view is reflecting the outlook that has developed within the Christian tradition, and which had in his time come to dominate that tradition. But there is perhaps a sense that Descartes, as a philosopher, should have known better.
2 . a c q u i e s c e n t i a a n d t h e t h r e e k i n d s o f c o g n i t i o n
Having clarified how Spinoza's discussion of acquiescentia in se ipso responds to Descartes, we may now examine more closely the account of acquiescentia developed throughout the Ethics. Like any species of love or hate, acquiescentia in se ipso is an inherently cognitive affect, since it involves the idea of a cause. Thus, Spinoza's account of acquiescentia is structured according to his distinction between three kinds of cognition: (1) opinion or imagination, (2) reason, (3) intuitive knowledge.
53 The relationship between acquiescentia and these three kinds of cognition illuminates the continuity and coherence of Spinoza's discussion of acquiescentia, on the one hand, and the complexity or "polyvalence" of the concept, on the other.
54 Using different English terms to translate acquiescentia 50 E III Def. Aff. XXV and XXVI.
51
E III Def. Aff. XXVII Expl.
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See E V Pref., where Spinoza wonders at the views of Descartes, "so great a man," "that most distinguished man," "a philosopher of his calibre"-although here he is discussing Descartes's general account of the soul's power over the passions, not the idea of free will specifically (although of course this general account certainly involves the concept of the will).
53
E IIP40S2.
54
For example, Julie Cooper highlights the "polyvalence" of acquiescentia in the Ethics and explores Spinoza's "ambivalence" towards this affect, which she explains in terms of a distinction between its as it appears and reappears through Parts III to V of the text obscures Spinoza's use of acquiescentia to denote a single affect which varies according to the kind of cognition that produces it.
55
When acquiescentia is understood in terms of the three kinds of cognition, its significance within Spinoza's philosophical system becomes clear. And it is not just that the three kinds of cognition illuminate acquiescentia; reciprocally, Spinoza's account of acquiescentia illuminates the three kinds of cognition. In particular, it indicates the experiential qualities by which these kinds of cognition can be recognized and distinguished. It is through the different forms of acquiescentia that we feel the effects of the different kinds of knowledge within our own being. To put it another way: we human beings live in relation to ourselves, with a certain understanding or awareness of ourselves, and this relationship always has an affective dimension. When it is based on imagination, acquiescentia is a hollow, volatile, egotistical satisfaction; when it is rooted in the second, rational kind of knowledge, it becomes a stable joy that can be shared with others; within the third kind of knowledge, acquiescentia signifies the feeling-quality of participation in God's eternity, giving content to the apparently abstract idea of intellectual love of God. And this affect, in its variable forms, links Spinoza's critique of free will, of Cartesian philosophy, and of superstition, with his account of true understanding and blessedness.
Throughout the Ethics, acquiescentia is used in a way that accurately reflects Spinoza's formal definition of this affect. According to this definition, acquiescentia is a joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause (or by the idea of an "internal cause"), a joy that arises when we consider ourselves and our power of acting.
56
All the instances of acquiescentia discussed in Parts III, IV and V consistently fit this description. But Spinoza states that some of these instances are vana (false, empty, vain, untrustworthy), while others are vera (true, genuine, properly named, well-founded). Since his definition of the affect encompasses both true and false acquiescentia, we have to look to the qualities of stillness and obedience signified by the word itself to provide the criteria for distinguishing them. If a joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause lacks these qualities, it must be vana. As we might expect of this cognitive affect, the inadequate understanding produced by the first kind of cognition gives rise to false acquiescentia, while the adequate understanding gained in the second and third kinds of knowledge generates true acquiescentia. But there are significant differences between the true acquiescentia arising from reason, passive and active variants (Cooper, Secular Powers, 91) . This analysis is not incorrect, but it can be made more precise. It is only when acquiescentia is understood in terms of the three kinds of cognition that its coherence within Spinoza's philosophical system becomes clear.
55
Giuseppina Totaro suggests that we find "an evolution, if not a real transformation" of acquiescentia from Ethics III to Ethics V, and she explains this "semantic evolution" in terms of the distinction between "reason" and "the intellect"-that is to say, between the second and the third kinds of knowledge ("Acquiescentia dans la cinquième partie de l'Ethique de Spinoza," 68-9). In focusing her analysis of acquiescentia on Ethics V, however, Totaro does not trace the changing significance of acquiescentia through all three kinds of knowledge-and it is this that provides the link between Spinoza's critique of free will, of Cartesian philosophy, and of superstition, and his account of acquiescentia as the experiential character, or feeling-quality, of true understanding and blessedness.
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E IIIP30 and scholium., E IIIP55S, E III Def. Aff. XXIV Expl., E III Def. Aff. XXV. s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a and that arising from scientia intuitiva. Here, neither the definition of the affect nor the distinction between adequate and inadequate cognition can explain this difference: again, it is the particular qualities of stillness and obedience conveyed by the word acquiescentia that provide the decisive criteria. So just as there are three kinds of cognition, so there are three kinds of acquiescentia. Let us examine each of these in turn.
Acquiescentia of the First Kind
We have already encountered this defective acquiescentia in considering Spinoza's critique of the equivalent Cartesian passion, la satisfaction de soi-même. But here we will look more closely at how it relates to the "cognition of the first kind" based on "opinion or imagination."
57 When Spinoza introduces the affect of acquiescentia in se ipso at E IIIP30 and defines it for the first time, he connects it to imagination: "If someone has done something which he imagines affects others with Joy, he will be affected by Joy accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will regard himself with Joy."
58 When he defines it again at E IIIP51, this time in conjunction with repentance, he emphasizes that "the things which [a man] believes will make for Joy or Sadness, and which he therefore strives to promote or prevent, are often only imaginary," and links this with the "inconstancy" of human nature and judgement.
59 It is here that he adds that " [b] ecause men believe themselves free, these affects [of acquiescentia in se ipso and repentance] are very violent." Belief in free will is not the basis of imaginary thinking, but a particularly significant instance of it.
The first kind of cognition encompasses "opinion" as well as "imagination." Spinoza brings these two together at E IIIP53, where he asserts that "when the Mind considers itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and does so the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting." In the corollary to this proposition, he points out that "this Joy is more and more encouraged the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others. For the more he imagines himself to be praised by others, the greater the Joy with which he imagines himself to affect others."
60 The joy of acquiescentia is conditioned by public opinion: by the values and attitudes of society in general, and of our own circle of acquaintances in particular. According to Spinoza, these opinions are often (though not necessarily) prejudices and superstitions. Because the affects of acquiescentia and gloria (Curley: 'love of esteem') are closely connected, our relationship to ourselves is intimately bound up with our relationships to others.
61 This means that the problems associated with imaginative acquiescentia are often compounded by social influences.
Spinoza's general account of the affects in Part III of the Ethics emphasizes their instability. Summing up this discussion in the scholium to E IIIP59, he links the affects with "vacillations of mind"-affectus, animique fluctuationes-and writes that "from what has been said it is clear that we are driven about in many ways by 57 E IIP40S2. external causes, and that, like waves on the sea, driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome or our fate."
62 Similarly, at E VP2 Spinoza seems to equate affect with vacillation or agitation: here he refers to animi commotionem, seu affectum and suggests that the affects of love and hate cause animi fluctuationes.
63
With regard to acquiescentia (of the first kind) in particular, he identifies two related consequences of this instability: it makes individuals anxious within themselves, and troublesome to others.
Spinoza hints at the anxiety-provoking character of acquiescentia in the scholium to E IIIP55, where we find the third definition of the affect, this time Philautia, vel Acquiescentia in se ipso, as "Joy arising from considering ourselves."
64 Because this joy "is renewed as often as a man considers his virtues, or his power of acting, it also happens that everyone is anxious [gestiat] to tell his own deeds, and to show off his powers, both of body and of mind." Spinoza adds here that "men, for this reason, are very troublesome to one another [homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint]."
65 He makes this point much more explicitly, though, when he returns to the subject of false, empty acquiescentia in Part IV. Here, it is opinion rather than imagination that emerges as the distinctive feature of the self-understanding on which this acquiescentia is based:
The love of esteem [Gloria] which is called empty [vana] is self-esteem [acquiescentia in se ipso] that is encouraged only by the opinion of the multitude. When that ceases, the acquiescentia in se ipso ceases, i.e. (by P52s), the highest good that each one loves. That is why he who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily, strives, sacrifices and schemes [quotidianâ curâ anxius nitatur, faciat, experiatur], in order to preserve his reputation. For the multitude is fickle and inconstant; unless one's reputation is guarded, it is quickly destroyed.
66
As well as making themselves anxious, people who pursue this acquiescentia become aggressively competitive with others. Indeed, those who succeed in gaining it may be the worst of all. In this struggle for acquiescentia, "the one who at last emerges as victor exults more in having harmed the other than in having benefited himself." 67 Spinoza emphasizes in this passage that it is precisely because acquiescentia is the "highest thing we can hope for," "the highest good that each one loves," that the false acquiescentia arising from inadequate understanding has such destructive consequences: "since this struggle is over a good thought to be the highest this gives rise to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way possible."
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Here, then, Spinoza argues that acquiescentia is as volatile as the opinions it rests on, generating agitation within both individuals and communities. In other words, it not only fails to produce the quies that belongs to genuine acquiescentia, but encourages unrest. It is not surprising that Spinoza concludes this paragraph by stating that " [t] 
E IIIP58S. s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a
Right at the end of the Ethics, where he contrasts the "wise man" with the "ignorant man," Spinoza returns to this idea that the person who lacks adequate knowledge is restless, anxious, agitated. The ignorant person is "troubled in many ways [multis modis agitatur] by external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind [vera animi acquiescentia] ."
70 Here the link between agitation, subjection to external causes, and false acquiescentia becomes more explicit than hitherto-it was implied in E IVP55, and in E IIIP59 we heard that "we are driven about in many ways by external causes" due to the "vacillations" of the affects in general. All human beings are influenced by external causes: Spinoza thinks that it is impossible not to be.
71 But being subject to forces beyond our control-so that they limit our power of acting, and so that we feel their effects within us-does not necessarily mean that we are "driven about" and thus rendered unstable by them. The ignorant man described at the conclusion to the Ethics is dominated by external causes: he is so entirely determined by them that they constitute his very existence, so that "as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be."
72
This emphasis on the power of external causes might appear at odds with the definition of acquiescentia, which as we have seen refers to the idea of an internal cause, i.e. the idea of oneself as a cause. Does this suggest that the "empty" acquiescentia that depends on external factors, such as the approval of other people, simply fails to qualify as acquiescentia-of any kind? This is not the case, because empty acquiescentia does involve an idea of oneself, as internal cause, but this idea is itself subject to external causes. In other words, it is a "mutilated" and "confused" idea in which one's own power and activity, one's assumptions about the moral status of certain actions based on custom and education; the opinions and reactions of others, and one's (perhaps mistaken) perception of those opinions and reactions are all mixed up together. This is certainly an inadequate idea of oneself, produced by a combination of imagination and opinion-a self-image, we might say-but it is still an idea of oneself, and thus of an internal cause.
The link between acquiescentia and subjection to external causes indicates that a certain conception of obedience, or indeed acquiescence, helps to distinguish false from true acquiescentia. We are perhaps most used to a heteronomous notion of obedience, signifying submission to an external authority. Relatedly, 'acquiescence' usually refers to a rather passive acceptance of another's will that is reluctant, helpless, or perhaps indifferent. This was equally true in the seventeenth century. Hobbes, for example, when discussing the interpretation of scripture in De Cive (1642), uses the verb acquiescere to describe heteronomous obedience to an external authority: "authoritati externae acquiescere, non constituere civitatem per se, sed esse externi illius subditos."
73 But Spinoza's use of acquiescentia suggests 70 E VP42S.
71
See E IVP3, P4.
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E VP42S. The 1651 English translation of De Cive has 'acquiesce' for acquiescere: "those subjects, who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a foreign authority in those doctrines which are necessary to salvation, do not per se constitute a city, but are the subjects of that foreign power" (Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society, chapter XVII, §27). a much more affirmative conception of obedience, which encompasses both following the laws of one's own nature, and wise acceptance of the necessity of divine law and (in other words) of the nature of which we are a part. This positive concept of obedience is itself complex, since it includes acquiescentia of the second and third kinds, and accommodates differences between them. I will call this 'immanent obedience,' in contrast to the heteronomous obedience of false acquiescentia. (When we examine the two kinds of true acquiescentia, we will see that the immanent obedience belonging to the second kind of knowledge can be called autonomous, while the immanent obedience belonging to the third kind of knowledge is characterized by dependence on God.)
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In the case of false acquiescentia, a person fails to follow the laws of his own nature insofar as he is determined by external causes. At the same time, he disobeys-that is to say, he refuses to accept-natural or divine necessity, insofar as he holds on to belief in free will. His acquiescentia in se ipso fails to live up to its name, because it is not "in itself" but subject to external influence, even though it involves an idea of himself. Because his idea of himself is an inadequate self-image, mediated by the inconstant opinions of the multitude, the 'self' he acquiesces in is not really his self at all. According to a distinctive Spinozist concept of immanent obedience, then, false acquiescentia is characterized by a lack of obedience as well as by a lack of stillness.
Acquiescentia of the Second Kind
As we have seen, in Ethics III, Spinoza introduces acquiescentia as an affect closely associated with imagination, and his discussion of this affect concerns either acquiescentia of the first kind, or a more general and neutral conception of acquiescentia which is not linked to any particular kind of cognition. In Part IV of the Ethics, however, he states that "[a]cquiescentia in se ipso can arise from reason, and only that acquiescentia in se ipso which does arise from reason is the greatest there
74
This concept of immanent obedience needs to be distinguished from the practical obedience, which need not involve knowledge of God's nature, that Spinoza makes central to his definition of true religion in chs. 13 and 14 of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus: "an intellectual or precise knowledge of God is not a gift generally given to the faithful, as obedience is. . . . All equally, men, women and children, can obey by command but cannot all be wise. . . . [A] person believes something piously or impiously only in so far as they are moved to obedience by their beliefs or, as a result of them, deem themselves free to offend or rebel [against God's word]. . . . God requires no other knowledge from men than that of his divine justice and charity, knowledge required not for intellectual understanding but only for obedience [to the moral law]" (TTP 174-177/SO III 169-172). However, this discussion in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus does accommodate the more philosophical concept of immanent obedience signified by acquiescentia. Spinoza writes, in ch. 14, that "it has nothing to do with faith whether one believes that God . . . governs all things by liberty or from the necessity of nature, whether He issues edicts like a prince or teaches them as eternal truths, whether man obeys God of his own free will or by the necessity of the divine decree" (TTP 183/SO III 178). We know from the Ethics that those with adequate understanding adopt the second of each of these alternatives, so that Spinoza is here indicating an obedience "by the necessity of the divine decree," this "decree" being synonymous with the "necessity of nature." On Spinoza's concept of obedience, see Etienne Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, 88-95. Balibar's analysis differs from mine, not least in focusing more on Spinoza's political writings, but he does indicate a connection between divine necessity and an obedience which "tends to cancel itself out through its own effects, as love and reason gradually gain the upper hand over fear and superstition" (92). s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a can be."
75 He demonstrates this proposition by reminding the reader that "man's true power of acting, or virtue, is reason itself (by IIIP3), which man considers clearly and distinctly."
76 And in elaborating it, Spinoza hints at both obedience and stillness. Concerning the former, he writes that "while a man considers himself, he perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, or adequately, except those things which follow from his power of understanding."
77 Concerning the latter, he emphasizes that acquiescentia is (like virtue) an end in itself: it is "really the highest thing we can hope for" because "no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of any end."
78
We need to put these remarks together with others in the Ethics to see how they indicate the qualities of obedience and stillness that belong to true acquiescentia. Let us begin with obedience.
I have already suggested that Spinoza's conception of adequate acquiescentia involves an affirmative obedience to oneself, understood as following the laws of one's own nature. At E IIID2, he defines action (as opposed to passivity) in these terms: "we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. when something in us or outside us follows from our nature."
79 He echoes this in Part IV, and links it explicitly with the second kind of knowledge: "acting from reason is nothing but doing those things which follow from the necessity of our nature, considered in itself alone (by 3p2 and D2)." 80 So when, at E IVP52, Spinoza describes true acquiescentia in terms of a self-reflection that consists of "those things which follow from [one's] power of understanding," he echoes his earlier reference to what "follows from our nature," and anticipates his description of rational action, a few propositions later, as "doing those things which follow from the necessity of our nature." Acquiescentia in se ipso is the affective, experiential aspect of obeying, i.e. expressing, our nature "considered in itself alone." Spinoza refers back to E IVP52 when, in Part V, he writes that "the highest satisfaction of mind [summa animi acquiescentia] stems from the right principle of living." 81 We should "keep this in mind," he advises, together with the fact that "men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature." 82 While the "fiction" of free will exacerbates the affects of love and hate, recognition of the way in which all beings follow "the necessity of nature" produces the peace of acquiescentia. This acquiescence in necessity is also emphasized in the Appendix to Part IV, where Spinoza suggests that it has a calming effect, even when we are subject to the vicissitudes of fortune:
We do not have absolute power to adapt things outside us to our use. 
83
This passage echoes remarks about calm acceptance of "matters of fortune" at the end of Part II, in the lengthy scholium to P49. Here Spinoza indicates "how much knowledge of [the will's necessity] is to our advantage in life." He explains that this understanding of necessity "teaches us how we must bear ourselves concerning matters of fortune, or things which are not in our power, that is, concerning things which do not follow from our nature-that we must expect and bear calmly [aequo animo exspectare, et ferre] both good fortune and bad." He adds here that "all things follow from God's eternal decree with the same eternal necessity as from the essence of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two right angles."
84
We can, then, identify two aspects of the immanent obedience of true acquiescentia. On the one hand, we actively follow the laws of our own nature when we are rational and virtuous (these being the same, for Spinoza). On the other hand, we actively follow the laws of nature as a whole when we are "conscious" that we are part of nature, and thus subject to it.
85 Although the former aspect relates to what is within our control, and the latter aspect to what lies beyond it, both are based on adequate understanding, which is itself an expression of our own power, and thus a source of joy. Both, then, can be accurately described as true acquiescentia.
In the passage from E IV's Appendix quoted above, the obedience and stillness of acquiescentia are brought together. The person who obeys necessity is able to "bear [it] calmly." Closely connected to this is a "satisfaction [acquiescentia]" that "wants nothing except what is necessary," i.e. nothing except what is. This suggests a kind of desire that rests in itself, rather than seeking something that is lacking. Spinoza has already outlined such a desire, in discussing love at the end of Part III. Here he explains that when it is said that a lover wills to join himself to the thing he loves, "by will I understand a Satisfaction [per voluntatem me Acquiescentiam intelligere] in the lover on account of the presence of the thing loved, by which the lover's Joy is strengthened or at least encouraged."
86 This "will" rests content with what it has; because it does not want anything else, it can rest (or acquiesce) in the present moment.
The stillness experienced in acquiescentia of the second kind is a quality of stability and equanimity. In contrast to the emotional volatility that accompanies the first kind of knowledge, the feeling-quality of adequate understanding is much more even (aequo) and peaceful. When the mind thinks about "those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and with which it is fully satisfied [plane acquiescit]," then not only will the affects of "Love, Hate, etc." be destroyed (here Spinoza refers us back to his discussion of animi commotionem and animi fluctuationes), but 83 E IV App. XXXII.
E IIP49S [IV.B].
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On the concept of consciousness in Spinoza, see Steven Nadler, "Spinoza on Consciousness." 86 E III Def. Aff. VI. s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a also "the appetites, or Desires, which usually arises from such an affect, cannot be excessive."
87 The point here is not that desire is lessened by reason, but that rational desire is such that there cannot be too much of it: "a desire which arises from reason . . . is the very essence, or nature, of man," and it makes no sense to say that human nature "could exceed itself, or could do more than it can."
88
It is important to emphasize that the quietude of adequate acquiescentia is not inert. On the contrary, it is active as opposed to passive, and self-expressive as opposed to self-restricting. And given the interdependence of human beings on one another, the internal stability of individuals whose acquiescentia comes from the second kind of knowledge will be conducive to political stability-and vice versa.
89
If the nature of each being is its desire or striving, then adequate acquiescentia does not slow or halt this striving, but stabilizes it, making it more immanent and less restless. On this point, we can note that, in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza uses the verb acquiescere to signify agreement or concord between people, in the context of a discussion of religious conflict: "people do not agree about everything [nec omnes in omnibus aeque acquiescere]; rather opinions govern men in different ways."
90
The mental stability of acquiescentia has a bodily correlate in the affect that Spinoza describes as hilaritas (Curley: 'cheerfulness'). In his Definitions of the Affects, Spinoza seems rather dismissive of the affects "chiefly related to the body," and does not define them.
91 Earlier in Part III of the Ethics, however, he states that "the idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body's power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind's power of thinking."
92 And indeed he describes hilaritas as "the affect of joy which is related to the mind and body at once."
93 In contrast to pleasure-which is also a joy relating to both mind and body-hilaritas affects all parts of the body equally.
94
It is a condition of physical stability or equilibrium, just as genuine acquiescentia involves mental stability and equanimity. When the body is affected by hilaritas, "all its parts maintain the same proportion of motion and rest to one another."
95
Spinoza asserts that hilaritas "is always good, and cannot be excessive"-since stability cannot be excessive.
96 But he reflects that this stability is very rare, "more easily conceived than observed."
97 Laurent Bove, who couples acquiescentia with hilaritas to accentuate the bodily aspects of adequate knowledge, and its blessedness, describes hilaritas as simultaneously restful and active. 
Acquiescentia of the Third Kind
Scientia intuitiva, Spinoza's "third kind of cognition," is a direct, immediate comprehension of God and of the way all things follow necessarily from God's nature.
101 What is known through this intuitive knowledge is the being-in-God of each singular thing: "Insofar as our mind knows itself and the body under a species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God."
102 This being-in-God is the basic principle of Spinoza's ontology. He asserts at E IP15 that " [w] hatever is, is in God," but elsewhere he expresses the same idea in the first person by appealing to the New Testament text of 1 John: "By this we know that we dwell in [God] , and he in us."
103 The acquiescentia accompanying this knowledge that all things-but perhaps especially oneself-are in God shares the qualities of stability, equanimity, and obedience to one's own nature that distinguish acquiescentia of the second kind from its false counterpart. But it also differs from the acquiescentia that is based solely on reason. Acquiescentia of the third kind is constituted by consciousness of being-in-God, and it is very closely related to the intellectual love of God in which divine and human consciousness (and joy) come together.
104 Indeed, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza, having cited Paul's Letter to the Galatians on the "fruits of the Holy Spirit," goes so far as to suggest that "the Holy Spirit . . . is in truth simply the mental peace [ Bove, La stratégie du conatus, 108. Bove's analysis differs from mine, however, insofar as he identifies hilaritas with the third kind of knowledge, rather than the second kind-see 111 in particular.
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On the third kind of knowledge, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Third Kind of Knowledge as Salvation"; Melamed, "Mapping the Labyrinth of Spinoza's Scientia Intuitiva"; and Carlisle, "Spinoza on Eternal Life." 102 E VP30. On the relation of "being in," or inherence (described by Don Garrett as "perhaps the most fundamental relation in Spinoza's metaphysics"), see Michael Della Rocca, "Rationalism run amok: representation and the reality of the emotions in Spinoza"; Don Garrett, "Representation and consciousness in Spinoza's naturalistic theory of the imagination"; Nadler, "'Whatever is, is in God'"; and Melamed, "Spinoza's Metaphysics of Substance." On the concept of being-in-God, see Carlisle, "Spinoza on Eternal Life." s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a his claim in Part IV that "only that acquiescentia in se ipso which [arises] from reason is the greatest there can be."
107 This does not seem to differentiate acquiescentia of the third kind from that of the second kind. We can note a change in terminology: here in Part V Spinoza uses the phrase Mentis acquiescentia for the first time (he repeats it at E VP32).
108 However, he reverts to acquiescentia animi in the final proposition of the text, which describes the "blessedness" arising from intuitive knowledge.
109
Spinoza also uses animi acquiescentia (together with the verb acquiescere) in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus to define blessedness: "true salvation and happiness [vera salus & beatitudo] 110 So we cannot infer the distinguishing features of acquiescentia of the third kind from Spinoza's references to Mentis acquiescentia.
The Demonstration of E VP27 indicates that-as we might expect, given the nature of the third kind of cognition-this acquiescentia differs from the second kind by its connection to God. Having just argued that "the greatest virtue of the mind, that is, the mind's power, or nature, or its greatest striving, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge,"
111 Spinoza explains that "he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the greatest human perfection, and consequently is affected with the greatest joy, accompanied by the idea of himself and his virtue. Therefore the greatest satisfaction [acquiescentia] there can be arises from this kind of knowledge."
112 In this third kind of cognition, however, the idea of oneself includes the idea of God: the mind "knows that it is in God and is conceived through God."
113 This means that acquiescentia of the third kind is accompanied by the idea of God as well as by the idea of oneself:
Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take pleasure in [eo delectamur], and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.
From this kind of knowledge there arises the greatest satisfaction of Mind [Mentis acquiescentia] there can be (by P27), i.e. (by Def. Aff. XXV), Joy; this Joy is accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently (by P30) it is also accompanied by the idea of God, as its cause, q.e.d.
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Spinoza introduces his concept of intellectual love of God in the Corollary to this proposition: "from this kind of knowledge there arises (by P32) Joy, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, i.e., Love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present (by P29), but insofar as we understand God to be eternal. And this is what I call intellectual love of God." See Totaro, "Acquiescentia dans la cinquième partie de l'Ethique de Spinoza," 68-9; and Rutherford, "The Place of Acquiescentia in Spinoza's Ethics," 458-9.
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E VP42Dem. According to Part III of the Ethics, the affects of acquiescentia and love are distinguishable insofar as the former is a joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause (i.e. the idea of oneself), while the latter is a joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause (i.e. the idea of another). But the Demonstration of E VP32, quoted above, suggests that in the third kind of cognition this distinction between internal and external causes is unsettled. In place of two distinct ideas-an idea of oneself, and an idea of God-intuitive knowledge offers a single idea: of oneself as "in" God, or (to put it another way) of God's nature as containing and expressing this singular existing being. This single idea is an immediate awareness of beingin-God. Spinoza makes this more explicit at VP36:
The mind's intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself. . . . It is an action by which the mind contemplates itself, with the accompanying idea of God as its cause (by P32 and P32C), that is, an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind, contemplates himself. . . . Whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind [animi acquiescentia], which is not really distinguished from Glory. For insofar as it is related to God, it is joy (if I may still be permitted to use this term), accompanied by the idea of himself [as its cause]. And similarly insofar as it is related to the mind.
116
So although the intellectual love of God can be distinguished conceptually from acquiescentia of the third kind, phenomenologically they are inseparable. Both are a joy arising from the idea of one's being-in-God: in other words, a joyful awareness of being-in-God.
117
In Ethics V, then, acquiescentia of the third kind and the intellectual love of God come together to constitute the affective dimension of the third kind of knowledge. Given that the intellectual love of God has already been much discussed by scholars, 118 we might wonder what is to be gained by focusing on acquiescentia of the third kind. But there are several features of this affect particular to the concept of acquiescentia. Most obviously, the way it is used throughout the Ethics ties it explicitly to the existential fact of our relatedness to ourselves: the fact that we always operate with a certain self-understanding, which has a certain emotional tone. Furthermore, the two distinctive features of acquiescentia that allow Spinoza to contrast true and false acquiescentia give content to the feeling-quality of the affect 116 E VP36 Dem. See also the scholium and corollary to this proposition. See Totaro, "Acquiescentia dans la cinquième partie de l'Ethique de Spinoza," 75: l'acquiescentia animi ne nait pas seulement de l'idée de soi mais de l'idée de Dieu comme principe et fondement de la connaissane en quoi consiste uniquement l'essentia mentis.
On the connection between acquiescentia and intellectual love of God, see Melamed, "Spinoza's Amor Dei Intellectualis." Melamed asks how Spinoza's concept of love, which involves the idea of an external cause, can be applied to God, who has no external cause, and he acknowledges that the love of God seems closer to the affect of acquiescentia. He suggests that, in Part V of the Ethics, Spinoza "attaches the additional title of 'intellectual love'" to the affect of acquiescentia in se ipso, and wonders why he does so. My account responds to Melamed's question by showing how the affects of acquiescentia and love that are clearly distinct in Part III converge to a single point in Part V, when they are related to the third kind of cognition, in which the idea of external causation is absorbed or dissolved into the singular truth of being-in-God, so that acquiescentia of the third kind and amor Dei intellectualis are two aspects of the same affect.
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See, for example, Alexandre Matheron, Individualité et relations interhumaines chez Spinoza, [583] [584] [585] [586] [587] [588] [589] [590] [591] [592] [593] [594] [595] [596] [597] [598] [599] [600] [601] [602] M. Gueroult, Spinoza, II; Yovel, " The Third Kind of Knowledge as Salvation"; Garrett, "Spinoza's Theory of Scientia Intuitiva"; and Melamed, "Mapping the Labyrinth of Spinoza's Scientia Intuitiva." s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a most commonly referred to as intellectual love of God. Unlike amor Dei intellectualis, acquiescentia conveys stillness, peace, rest. Just as these feeling-qualities provide a criterion for recognizing true acquiescentia, so they fill out a phenomenological account of the blessedness associated particularly with the third kind of knowledge. And the idea of obedience that is invoked by acquiescentia gives content to both the being-in-God and the "freedom" attained in blessedness.
We have seen that the stillness belonging to acquiescentia of the second kind is a state not of immobility, but of stability, which contrasts with the instability accompanying the first kind of knowledge. It is an equanimity of mind, mirrored by equilibrium in the body (hilaritas). This stability is a prerequisite for gaining the third kind of knowledge (and thus for enjoying all that arises from it), but the stillness of acquiescentia of the third kind must differ from it. Acquiescentia of the second kind involves a stability of duration, while acquiescentia of the third kind involves the stillness of eternity.
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This highest kind of acquiescentia is closely tied to eternity when Spinoza describes "the wise man" at the very end of the Ethics: "the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit [vix animo movetur] , but being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious [conscius] of himself, and of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true peace of mind [sed semper vera animi acquiescentia]."
120 "Never ceasing to be" and "always possessing true peace of mind" are presented here as two aspects of a single condition, or even as two ways of describing the same condition. These closing comments reinforce Spinoza's suggestion, a few propositions earlier, that acquiescentia of the third kind is linked to what "remains" of the mind after the body perishes: "because (by P27) the highest acquiescentia there can be arises from the third kind of knowledge, it follows from this that the Mind can be of such a nature that the part of the Mind which we have shown perishes with the body (see P21) is of no moment in relation to what remains."
121 This is not the place to reflect on Spinoza's account of the eternity of the mind, which I have discussed in detail elsewhere.
122 But we can consider how this connection with eternity qualifies acquiescentia of the third kind, and conversely how this acquiescentia gives an indication of the phenomenological quality of eternal life. Indeed, this illuminates Spinoza's enigmatic claim that "we feel and know by experience that we are eternal," for the uninterrupted peace and stillness that characterize acquiescentia of the third kind is the feeling of eternity.
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The three kinds of acquiescentia signify three different qualities of thinking: the unsettled, confused, anxious thinking of imagination and opinion; the stable, ordered thinking of reason; and the intuitive thinking that understands things immediately, as they are in God, sub specie aeternitatis. The thinking that takes place in the second kind of knowledge is a process of reasoning that traces, step by step, the logical connections between ideas and the causal connections between things. Intuitive thinking, however, is not a process: it grasps the truth immediately. This difference between the second and third kinds of cognition is illustrated by Spinoza's example of finding a fourth proportional number, given a sequence of three numbers. In the second kind of cognition the number is found by applying a Euclidian principle, once one has understood the demonstration of this principle. In the third kind of cognition, the fourth proportional is seen "in one glance."
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So although this intuitive kind of thinking is certainly an activity, it is not a process. It sees what "follows" from God not as a sequence of effects, but as a simple yet fully intelligible inherence or manifestation.
This interpretation of acquiescentia of the third kind may be supported by a remark concerning the human intellect in Spinoza's letter to Oldenburg of September 1661, where Spinoza lists the errors he finds in the philosophies of Descartes and Bacon. He criticizes Bacon in particular for placing certain limitations on the human intellect-a criticism that, in light of Spinoza's mature epistemology, amounts to the claim that Bacon fails to recognize the possibility of the third kind of knowledge.
125 Spinoza lists three key Baconian limitations, the third one being the assumption that "the human understanding is unquiet, it cannot stop or rest [quod intellectus humanus gliscat, neque consistere, aut acquiescere possit]."
126 Here the verb acquiescere is used to signify the intellect's capacity for repose. By putting acquiescere in contrast with gliscere, which means to swell up, blaze up, burst out, Spinoza suggests that in the third kind of knowledge the mind is emptied of the clamouring crowd of images, "common notions," and "ideas of the properties of things" which it uses for thinking according to the first and second kinds of knowledge.
127 Insofar as acquiescentia of the third kind is an affect, it signifies the feeling-quality of intuitive thinking. It is not, then, simply an absence of emotional disturbance-although of course it is this as well.
While acquiescentia of the third kind gives the deepest rest and peace, it also expresses the highest degree of activity and striving. Spinoza states that "the greatest virtue of the mind, that is, the mind's power, or nature, or its greatest striving, is 124 E IIP40S2. Spinoza gave the same example in the Short Treatise and the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione. In the Short Treatise, he refers to the immediacy of intuition: "through his penetration he immediately sees the proportion in all the calculations" (SO I 55). In the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, he suggests that when "Mathematicians . . . see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers," they do so "not by the force of that [Euclidean] proposition, but intuitively, without going through any procedure" ( §24 Spinoza lists three limitations imposed on the intellect by Bacon: "first, [he] supposes that, besides the deceptions of the senses, the human intellect is fallible by its own nature . . . second, that the human intellect on account of its peculiar nature is prone to make abstractions, and imagines things to be stable which are in flux, etc. Thirdly, that the human understanding is unquiet, it cannot stop or rest." The first of these limitations applies to Spinoza's first kind of knowledge; while the second and third limitations encompass both the first and second kinds of knowledge. See Letter 2: Correspondence 76-7/SO IV 9.
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Letter 2: Correspondence 76-7/SO IV 9.
127 See E IIP40S2. s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a to understand things by the third kind of knowledge."
128 Just two propositions later he asserts that "the greatest acquiescentia there can be arises from this kind of knowledge."
129 There is something paradoxical about this, which Spinoza seems to acknowledge. The language of the affects becomes problematic in the third kind of cognition, and there is inevitably an element of "feigning" in speaking of an eternal joy, and of the "passage" to the third kind of acquiescentia.
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Just as the stillness of acquiescentia of the third kind is connected to the consciousness of things (including oneself) as being-in-God, sub specie aeternitatis, so the obedience aspect of this acquiescentia relates to the necessity of God's nature. While acquiescentia of the second kind involves an affirmative, expressive "obedience" to the laws of one's own nature, the highest acquiescentia sees these laws as divine laws, so that obedience to oneself becomes indistinguishable from obedience to God. Obedience to the God of superstitious religion, mediated by a confused amalgamation of imagination and received opinion, is inevitably a heteronomous submission. In this obedience, one's own power of acting is surrendered to a God envisaged as external, and to a human authority (such as a church or a dogma) which competes with one's power, and diminishes it. Acquiescentia of the second kind reverses this weakening effect by making obedience immanent and autonomous. But it is in acquiescentia of the third kind, where one's dependence on God is the core truth grasped in intuitive knowledge, that the highest human freedom is found. This is a different kind of autonomy, combining fidelity to one's own finite power with the understanding that this is a dependent part, and an expression, of an infinite power.
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Thus Spinoza's concept of acquiescentia is central to his critique of Descartes's account of human freedom. By correlating this affect to the three kinds of cognition, he relegates Cartesian acquiescentia to the first, inadequate kind of cognition and argues that it is not only founded on error, but psychologically, spiritually and socially harmful. Spinoza employs the concept of acquiescentia to both critique and replace the Cartesian free will that he rejects as a "fiction," for acquiescentia indicates a freedom that is identical to necessity. Insofar as this is a "human freedom"-as the title of Ethics V indicates-it participates in divine freedom. "God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one," and "God alone is a free cause, for God alone exists only from the necessity of his nature."
132 But a human being can approximate this freedom-in-necessity through his acquiescentia, "being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of himself, and of God, and of things." c o n c l u s i o n : a c q u i e s c e n t i a i n t h e o r y a n d i n p r a c t i c e By now it should be clear why it is misleading to attribute to Spinoza the view that "self-esteem is the highest thing we can hope for. III and IV of the affect that Curley calls 'self-esteem' concerns acquiescentia of the first kind. We have seen that this acquiescentia in se ipso is defined in terms of imagination and opinion, which produce "mutilated and confused" cognition. This may appear to be a positive affect in contrast with humility and repentance, since it signifies an increase in power, and thus is a joy, not a sadness. But acquiescentia of the first kind is "empty," "vain," precisely insofar as it falls short of the qualities of stillness and immanent obedience that constitute "true" acquiescentia. That is to say, it is empty because it is volatile, anxiety-provoking, and heteronomous. One might as well say that "inadequate (or, more bluntly, false) acquiescentia is the highest thing we can hope for." And Spinoza does not, of course, think that.
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As a joy accompanied by the idea of oneself, acquiescentia signifies the feelingquality of the human being's self-relatedness. This affect can be true or false-in the sense of authentic or inauthentic-depending on whether it arises from adequate or inadequate self-understanding. Just as Spinoza distinguishes three kinds of cognition, the first kind inadequate and the second and third kinds adequate, so there are three corresponding kinds of acquiescentia. The name for this affect indicates the quality of stillness or repose (quies), and in moving from the first to the third kind we see an increase in stillness that is also, crucially, an increase in activity or power. This empowerment can be elucidated through a distinctive conception of immanent obedience: inadequate acquiescentia falls short of this criterion, while adequate acquiescentia fulfils it.
Tracing these correlations between acquiescentia and the three kinds of cognition brings into view the three-fold structure of Spinoza's account of acquiescentia. Corresponding to the three kinds of cognition (1) agitation (2) stability (3) rest
The psychological states corresponding to these are:
(1) anxiety (2) equanimity (3) peace
And the forms of obedience are:
(1) heteronomy (2) autonomy (3) being-in-God
This three-fold structure exposes the error of Poiret's claim that Spinozist acquiescentia is "an abominable vice, head and root of all of them, and true atheism." This critique is based on the assumption that Spinoza describes as our highest good an affect which is directly opposed to the Christian virtues of humility and repentance. But the acquiescentia in se ipso that is distinguished from these other affects is acquiescentia of the first kind. This acquiescentia belongs, together with
See Rutherford, "Salvation as a State of Mind: The Place of Acquiescentia in Spinoza's Ethics," 459: "Accepting a systematic semantic distinction between acquiescentia in se ipso and acquiescentia animi, we must conclude that Spinoza is speaking loosely in IVP52S, when he says that the former is 'the highest thing we can hope for.' Part V demonstrates, on the contrary, that 'man's highest happiness, or blessedness' is to be identified only with the 'contentment of mind' that arises from the third kind of knowledge." s p i n o z a ' s a c q u i e s c e n t i a humility and repentance, within the domain of the imagination-the basis of superstitious religion-and so these affects are, according to Spinoza, equally volatile, confused, and debilitated. So Spinoza does not simply invert the traditional Christian schema of virtue and vice, elevating pride and self-satisfaction above humility and repentance. Rather, he shows why this whole evaluative schema rests on misunderstanding. From this point of view, Poiret's critique is itself rooted in cognition of the first kind: it is a symptom of the superstition that Spinoza responds to, and the account of adequate acquiescentia developed through Ethics IV and V is an important part of this response. In fact, the highest kind of acquiescentia is far from atheistic and hubristic.
134 On the contrary: it is distinguished by an obedience that is based on consciousness of being-in-God. And this yields a certain kind of humility (although Spinoza does not call it this), since it is an awareness of ontological dependence on God. Of course, this 'humility' is not a feeling of weakness or smallness, but a feeling of the highest degree of power or activity that a human being can express, by virtue of "participation in the divine nature."
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Spinoza's definition of acquiescentia indicates the basic existential fact of human self-relatedness, and this affect, we have seen, is at the heart of his conception of the highest human good. This situates Spinoza's practical philosophy within the ethical tradition described by Michel Foucault as "care for the self."
136 Through his account of acquiescentia, Spinoza shows how our self-relationship can be constituted heteronomously, and thus disempowered; he also indicates the possibility of a more empowering self-relation based on true self-understanding. Much more could be said about Spinoza's contribution to the conception of philosophy as practice accentuated by Foucault, and explored by thinkers such as Pierre Hadot and, more recently, Peter Sloterdijk. Elsewhere I have shown how Ethics V offers an account of practice that puts the habit-producing operations of imaginative thinking outlined in Ethics II in the service of adequate knowledge.
137 And the theoretical discussion of acquiescentia set out in this paper needs to be developed further by showing how true acquiescentia might be practiced. In the Ethics, Spinoza suggests certain techniques for cultivating this affect, while others might be inferred from his analysis of acquiescentia. There is no space here to elaborate on these practices. But completing this work will place Spinoza's Ethics in a tradition of "philosophy 134 Julie Cooper reaches a similar conclusion, but with a different emphasis: "Spinoza's enthusiasm for acquiescentia reflects a recognition of human interdependence and a commitment to egalitarian community-not, as Poiret complained, an aspiration to divine self-sufficiency" (Secular Powers, 100). Cooper is right, I think, to argue that Spinoza's radicalism lies in his attempt "to reframe the question of human finitude, refusing the Augustinian demand to choose between humility and pride" (Secular Powers, 104). But because her primary concern is to show that Spinoza's thought is "consistent with egalitarian politics" (Secular Powers, 102), she overlooks the important differences between acquiescentia of the second kind and that of the third kind. And her commitment to a secularizing reading of Spinoza-albeit a nuanced and compelling version of such a reading: means that she would not recognize being-in-God as the fundamental principle of Spinoza's thought-see especially 102-4. On the relationship between Spinoza's acquiescentia and Christian conceptions of self-love, see Bove, La stratégie du conatus, and Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, E IVP45S. [ 
